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Abstract 
 
We examine how short sellers affect corporate disclosures using a natural experiment. From May 
2005 to July 2007, the SEC implemented a pilot program by randomly selecting one third of 
Russell 3000 stocks and removing the short sale price tests for these stocks (referred to as pilot 
firms), leading to lower short-selling constraint, without changing the requirement for other firms 
(referred to as control firms). We compare the change in corporate disclosures between the pilot 
firms and the control firms during this period. We find that compared to the control firms, the 
pilot firms are more likely to issue good news management forecasts without changing the 
issuance of bad news forecasts. We also find that the decrease in short-selling constraint for the 
pilot firms (1) leads to an increased likelihood of bundling bad news forecasts with good news 
earnings announcements, and (2) does not lead to an increase in the optimistic bias in 
management forecasts. Overall, our evidence suggests that the reduction in short-selling 
constraint motivates managers to disclose good news in a more timely fashion.  
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we examine how short sellers affect corporate disclosures. The motivation for 
the research question is two-fold. First, short sellers are becoming an increasingly important group 
of traders in the capital markets. For example, short sales account for more than 20% of the trading 
volume in the period 2000-2004 (Boehmer et al. 2013). As shown in Figure 1, short interest, 
measured as the average monthly short interest scaled by the number of outstanding shares, almost 
doubled from the 1990s to the 2000s.
1
 Short sellers play an important role in the information 
discovery process, particularly in incorporating bad news into stock prices (e.g., Boehmer and Wu 
2013). However, despite the importance and prevalence of short-selling, we know little about 
whether and how short sellers affect corporate disclosures. The limited research on the impact of 
short sellers is in sharp contrast with the large number of studies on the impact of other market 
participants, such as institutional investors, family owners, and financial analysts, on corporate 
disclosures. 
Second, unlike institutional investors or financial analysts, whose presence is generally 
welcome by managers, short sellers are typically not viewed favorably. Disputes between 
managers and short sellers often capture the headlines of the business press. Short sellers are not 
welcome not only because of the downward pressure of short-selling on stock prices, but also 
because of the potentially adverse impact on stakeholders’ confidence in the firm and the ensuing 
long-run damaging effect on firms’ financing and operation (e.g., Khanna and Mathews 2012). 
                                                 
1 Note that short interest is inherently a small proportion of the outstanding shares. Beneish et al (2013) find that for stocks that 
are more difficult to borrow, less than 10 percent of the outstanding shares are relatively easy to locate and thus lendable; even for 
stocks that are easier to borrow, less than 20 percent of the outstanding shares are lendable.  
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Therefore, managers have incentives to discourage short sellers. Prior research finds that firms 
undertake some dramatic measures, such as legal actions, against short sellers (e.g., Lamont 2012). 
It is unclear whether firms change disclosure policy, one of the most direct ways through which 
manager can influence the market perceptions, to discourage short interest.  
One challenge of examining the impact of short sellers on corporate disclosures is the 
potential endogeneity issue. The association between the observed level of short interest and 
corporate disclosures is subject to endogeneity because the causality can go either way. Managers 
might change disclosure policy in response to short interest and at the same time, short interest is 
affected by disclosures. To address this potential endogeneity, we utilize a natural experiment – 
the SEC’s temporary suspension of the tick test for a randomly selected group of firms in 
2005-2007 – to test the impact of short sellers on corporate disclosures.  
Traditionally, short-selling was subject to SEC Rule 10a-1, NYSE’s uptick rule, and 
Nasdaq’s bid price test. These rules and tests, referred to as the tick test for convenience, imposed 
constraints on short-selling.
2
 On June 23, 2004, the SEC announced a pilot program by adopting 
Regulation SHO to temporarily suspend the tick test for a group of randomly selected firms (i.e., 
the pilot firms) and subsequently announced the list of the pilot firms on July 28, 2004.
 3
 Starting 
from May 2, 2005, the pilot firms were exempt from the tick test for short sale orders. The 
temporary suspension expired on July 6, 2007 when the SEC decided to permanently suspend the 
tick test for all the publicly-traded U.S. companies. As such, during the pilot program, the 
                                                 
2 Please see Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of the tick test. 
3 Specifically, the SEC separated the U.S. firms in the 2004 Russell 3000 index into three groups based on the exchange on 
which the stocks were traded (NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq) and ranked them based on average trading volume within each group. 
The SEC then selected every third stock from each group. 
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short-selling constraint became lower for the pilot stocks and it was easier and less costly to take 
short positions in the pilot stocks than in the other stocks (referred to as the control stocks 
hereafter). Prior studies provide consistent evidence that short-selling increases significantly for 
the pilot stocks compared to the control stocks during the pilot program (e.g., Boehmer et al. 2008; 
Diether et al. 2009a, Grullon et al. 2013) . The combination of an exogenous shock to the 
short-selling constraint and the randomization of the treatment group provide us with an ideal 
setting to examine how short-selling, as affected by short-selling constraints, affects corporate 
disclosures.  
We argue that managers of the pilot firms have incentives to change disclosures in response 
to the reduction in short-selling constraint and the increase in short-selling. The incentives are 
different for good news disclosures and bad news disclosures. We consider the disclosure of good 
news first.  As discussed in detail in Section 2, managers’ welfare is usually positively related to 
stock prices and managers prefer short sellers not to take position in their firm’s stock. Prior 
research (e.g., Lamont and Stein 2004; Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos 2011; Hong et al. 2012) finds 
that the disclosure of good news leads to lower short interest. (We confirm that in our sample, the 
issuance of good news forecasts leads to lower short interest.) In addition, if short sellers expect 
firms to disclose good news in a more timely fashion, they are less willing to take a short position 
in the firm’s stock for the fear of losing out when they have to close their position. Managers may 
also have incentives to disclose good news in order to boost the confidence of the stakeholders in 
the firm. It thus follows that the pilot firms will increase the disclosure of good news compared to 
the control firms.  
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With respect to bad news disclosures, there is prior evidence that short sellers’ trading gains 
lead them to increase their position (Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos 2011). (We confirm that in our 
sample, the issuance of bad news forecasts leads to higher short interest.) This provides managers 
with incentives to withhold bad news. However, withholding bad news can backfire because short 
sellers are generally regarded as “extremely well informed” (Boehmer et al. 2013) and overpricing 
of stocks that result from withholding bad news can actually increase the short-selling profit and 
hence attract short interest. In addition, withholding bad news is subject to litigation risk (Skinner 
1994, 1997), which potentially becomes greater for the pilot firms under the pilot program due to 
the increase in short-selling and the faster incorporation of bad news into the share prices. Thus, 
managers of the pilot firms have conflicting incentives related to bad news disclosures and it is 
unclear whether they will increase or decrease bad news disclosures relative to the control firms.    
To summarize, while we expect that the pilot firms are more likely to disclose good news 
during the pilot program compared to the control firms, the prediction regarding bad news 
disclosures is non-directional. To test the predictions, we adopt a difference-in-differences 
approach. We first measure the change in corporate disclosures between the period prior to the 
pilot program (i.e., the pre period) and the period when the pilot program was in place (i.e., the post 
period); we then compare the change between the pilot stocks and the control stocks.  
Our main findings are as follows. First, compared to the control firms, the pilot firms are 
significantly more likely to increase good news management forecasts from the pre period to the 
post period. At the same time, compared to the control firms, the pilot firms are not associated with 
a significant change in the frequency or likelihood of bad news management forecasts. Second, we 
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find that the results for good news forecasts are stronger when managers are more concerned with 
stock price drops, such as when managers’ wealth is more sensitive to stock price changes or when 
the firm’s stock is more difficult to value because of large magnitude of accruals or volatile 
earnings. These cross-sectional variations reinforce the main inference. Third, we find that relative 
to the control firms, the pilot firms are more likely to bundle bad news forecasts with good news 
earnings announcements in the post period compared to the pre period. Thus the pilot firms appear 
to be more likely to time bad news forecasts to reduce the adverse price impact. Overall, our results 
indicate that in response to the reduction in short-selling constraint, the pilot firms increase the 
frequency of good news forecasts without decreasing the frequency of bad news forecasts, except 
that they are more likely to bundle bad news forecasts with good news earnings announcements. 
The lack of results on the frequency of bad news disclosures is possibly due to the conflicting 
incentives related to bad news disclosures, as discussed above.  
We conduct several additional analyses to enrich the results. First, we find that there is no 
significant change in management forecast bias for the pilot firms from the pre period to the post 
period. This finding is important because it indicates that the increase in good news forecasts for 
the pilot firms is not due to managers becoming more optimistically biased.  Second, in July 2007 
the SEC permanently removed the tick test for all the stocks. As a result, the control firms 
experienced a shock to the short-selling constraint while the pilot firms experienced no change. 
We find that the control firms are associated with a significant increase in the likelihood and 
frequency of good news forecasts relative to the pilot firms after the permanent removal of the tick 
test. This reinforces our main results. Third, we investigate whether issuing good news forecasts 
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can indeed reduce short interest. The analysis of the change in short interest surrounding 
management forecasts supports this.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it contributes to the 
disclosure literature by providing evidence on how short sellers, an important group of players in 
the stock market, influence companies’ disclosures. Thus, our study complements the existing 
literature that examines how various market participants, such as institutional investors, family 
owners, and financial analysts, influence corporate disclosures. Overall this line of research 
suggests that companies change their disclosures to reflect the market participants’ preferences. 
The impact of short sellers on corporate disclosures differs from the other market participants in 
two ways. First, while the impact of the other market participants on disclosures is through their 
demand for information, the impact of short sellers is indirect and arises from managers’ desire to 
discourage short sellers and maintain the stock price. Second, unlike the other market participants, 
who generally have symmetric effect on disclosures of good news and bad news, short sellers 
mainly affect good news disclosures.  
Second, our study enhances the understanding of short sellers’ role in the capital markets. 
The evidence suggests that short sellers not only help incorporate bad news into the share prices, as 
documented in prior research (e.g., Boehmer and Wu 2013), but also help bring good news 
forward. While the former is through short sellers’ information acquisition and trading activities, 
the latter is through managers’ disclosures in response to short selling or the threat of it. The 
evidence should be of interest to regulators as it sheds light on how the change in short-selling 
constraints affects firm disclosures, which regulators have not considered when debating whether 
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and how to regulate short-selling. Together with the studies that examine the impact of Regulation 
SHO on short-selling, stock market quality, investment and financing activities, and the extent of 
earnings management (Diether et al. 2009a; Grullon et al. 2013; Fang et al. 2013), our study helps 
provide a more comprehensive picture of the effect of this important regulation. 
Third, our findings add to the evidence on the actions taken by firms to discourage 
short-selling. Lamont (2012) uses a small sample, 266 firms over the period of 1977-2002, and 
focuses on legal actions against short sellers. Liu and Swanson (2011) examine whether firms use 
stock repurchases to reduce short interest and Laksanbunsong and Wu (2014) examine whether 
insiders counter the effect of short selling via insider purchases. Our findings complement these 
studies by examining corporate disclosures.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional 
background, reviews prior literature, and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample. 
Section 4 presents the main empirical results and Section 5 presents the additional analyses. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background, prior research, and hypothesis development 
2.1 Institutional background on the pilot program 
In 1938, the SEC adopted Rule 10a-1, often referred to as the uptick rule, to restrict 
short-selling activities. According to the SEC, “Rule 10a-1(a) (1) provided that, subject to certain 
exceptions, a listed security may be sold short (A) at a price above the price at which the 
immediately preceding sale was effected (plus tick), or (B) at the last sale price if it is higher than 
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the last different price (zero-plus tick). Short sales were not permitted on minus ticks or 
zero-minus ticks, subject to narrow exceptions.”4 In 1994, the Nasdaq adopted a bid price test to 
determine whether short sales are allowed for shares traded on Nasdaq (Nasdaq Rule 3350). Short 
sales on Nasdaq are not allowed at or below the best bid when the current best bid is at or below the 
previous best bid. These rules and tests, referred to as the tick test for convenience, impose 
constraints on short-selling. Prior studies find that the stocks are more difficult to short after the 
introduction of short-selling restrictions (e.g., Jones and Lamont 2002).  
On June 23, 2004, the SEC adopted Regulation SHO (REG SHO) to provide a new 
regulatory framework for short-selling in the U. S. stock markets. Among other things, REG SHO 
temporarily suspended the tick test for a group of randomly selected listed companies in order to 
evaluate the effectiveness and necessity of short-selling restrictions. On July 28, 2004, about 1,000 
U.S. stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq were selected as the pilot stocks. Starting from 
May 2, 2005, the pilot stocks were exempt from the tick test. The temporary suspension expired on 
July 6, 2007 when the SEC permanently suspended the tick test for all the publicly-traded U.S. 
companies. The permanent suspension of the tick test drew criticisms from firms and former 
regulators, including former SEC chairman Christopher Cox. The criticism intensified with the 
financial crisis in 2008-2009 due to the concern that financial stocks may be subject to market 
manipulations via short-selling. On February 24, 2010, the SEC reinstated the uptick rule, but only 
under the circumstance when a security’s price drops by 10% or more from the last day’s closing 
price. 
                                                 
4 “Amendments to Exchange Act Rule 10a-1 and Rules 201 and 200(g) of Regulation SHO.” SEC 2008-05-21. 
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Therefore, compared to the control stocks, the pilot stocks experience a decrease in 
short-selling constraints during the pilot program. Prior studies provide consistent evidence that 
short selling increases significantly for the pilot stocks relative to the control stocks during the 
pilot program (e.g., Boehmer et al. 2008, Diether et al. (2009a), Grullon et al. 2013). Depending on 
the measures used, the tick test is found to inhibit around one tenth to more than one fifth of 
short-selling. These studies also find that the pilot program somewhat worsens market quality, but 
there is mixed evidence on the impact of the short-selling constraints on price level and volatility. 
Recent studies find that the pilot program affects corporate decisions. Grullon et al. (2013) find 
that the financially constrained pilot firms are associated with reduction in equity issuance and 
investments during the pilot program. Fang et al. (2013) find that the pilot firms are less likely to 
engage in earnings management during the pilot program than the control firms. In sum, prior 
studies indicate that Regulation SHO has an important impact on short selling. Hence this is a 
powerful setting to examine how short sellers affect firms’ disclosures. 
2.2 Prior research on short selling 
There is a long line of literature on short selling and stock returns. This literature generally 
find that short sellers are on average informed traders; short sellers as a whole unearth 
over-valued companies and abnormal short interest is associated with future negative stock 
returns (e.g., Dechow et al. 2001; Jones and Lamont 2002; Ofek and Richardson 2003; Pownall 
and Simko 2005; Desai et al. 2006; Boehmer et al. 2008; Hirshleifer et al. 2011; Boehmer and Wu 
2013; Kecskes et al. 2013). Prior findings suggest that short sellers’ information advantage comes 
from private information acquisition, fundamental analysis based on public information, as well as 
10 
 
 
skilled processing of public information (e.g., Desai et al. 2006; Drake et al. 2011; Engelberg et al. 
2012; Christensen et al. 2013; Desai et al. 2013).
5
 Overall, prior studies suggest that short sellers 
are important contributors to efficient prices.  
At the same time, short sellers are viewed with considerable skepticism for the following 
reasons. First, short sellers, through taking and covering short positions, can increase market 
volatility, potentially leading to higher perceived risk. Hong et al. (2012) and Savor and 
Gamboa-Cavazos (2011) find that the prices of heavily shorted stocks are excessively sensitive to 
new information relative to other stocks. They find that short sellers cover their positions after the 
announcement of good earnings news, pushing stock prices further up and leading to high 
volatility. Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos (2011) also find that short sellers increase their positions 
after trading gains from decreases in stock prices, pushing stock prices further down, again leading 
to high volatility.
6
 Second, manipulative short sellers can target a stock, encourage others to sell, 
perhaps by spreading rumors about the prospect of the firm, and then cover their short positions at 
a profit. This leads to disorderly market.
7
  
Third, short selling is also believed to be harmful to the firm because of the feedback effect 
on the firm’s operations.  Short interest can make existing (or potential) stakeholders lose 
confidence in the firm and stop dealing with it. It is difficult to tell whether a stock is overpriced or 
not; neither managers nor short sellers can confidently claim that a firm’s share is overpriced or 
not. The stakeholders may take short position as a signal of overpricing and react accordingly, 
                                                 
5 Some studies suggest that short sellers also benefit from front-running or tipping (Khan and Lu 2013,Christophe et al. 2010). 
6 Lamont and Stein (2004) examine the aggregate short interest during the dot-com bubble period and find that short-selling is 
not helpful in stabilizing the overall stock market. 
7 Many companies complain that short sellers can be manipulative and detrimental to shareholders. Examples include 
Overstock.com, Sedona Corp., Medizone International Inc.  
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making it more difficult for the firm to attract investors, capital and customers, leading to 
deterioration of performance. For example, Goldstein and Guembel (2008) show analytically that 
traders have incentives to short a firm’s stock because of the feedback effect from the capital 
market to the real value of the firm. Khanna and Mathews (2012) argue that the damage of short 
selling “is caused not so much by the initial drop in stock price, but through its feedback effect on 
the real decisions of the firm’s counterparties, since that not only amplifies the firm’s price drop 
but also makes it more permanent.” Grullon et al. (2013) find that during the pilot program, 
financially constrained pilot firms experience reduction in equity issues and investments.  
2.3 Hypothesis development 
We argue that managers have incentives to change disclosures in response to increase in 
short selling because short-selling affects managers’ welfare and firms’ prospects and disclosures, 
on the other hand, can be used to influence share prices, short interest, and investor perceptions. 
We elaborate below.   
 Managers’ welfare, such as compensation, job security and reputation, is positively linked 
to the level of the stock price. Hence decreases in stock prices can adversely affect managers’ 
welfare and managers are generally reluctant to correct stock over-pricing. Jensen (2005) observes 
that despite the importance of correcting over-valuation of equity, few managers are willing to do 
so, contributing to the so-called agency costs of overvalued equity.
8
 In addition, as discussed 
above, short-selling can increase stock volatility, be speculative rather than based on 
fundamentals, and adversely affect the stakeholders’ confidence and the long-run performance of 
                                                 
8 Managers’ reluctance to correct over-pricing is also reflected in their aversion to financial analysts’ sell recommendations, 
which is well discussed in the literature. 
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the firm. Thus, managers typically view short-selling negatively. For example, short sellers are 
believed by some managers to be “evil and damaging to the firm (Jensen 2005, p.16).” 
Thus, with the implementation of the pilot program, managers of the pilot firms will have 
incentives to discourage short sellers and to reduce the impact of short interest. We predict that 
they will resort to corporate disclosures, since disclosing is one of the most direct tools managers 
have at their disposal to influence share prices and market perceptions. We next discuss how 
managers of the pilot firms will change the disclosures. We follow the disclosure literature by 
assuming that managers’ disclosure decision is based on the costs and benefits of disclosures and 
disclosures of the pilot firms may change during the pilot program because of changes in such 
costs and benefits. Below we separately discuss good news and bad news disclosures because they 
can affect short interest differently.  
Good news disclosures. Prior studies argue that good news disclosures can decrease short 
interest. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the hedge funds that specialize in short-selling are 
usually open-ended. When the stock price increases, short sellers will lose money and likely face 
redemption by the clients. As a result, they will be forced to close their short positions. Savor and 
Gamboa-Cavazos (2011) argue that because short sellers’ compensation is linked to investment 
performance, they are subject to myopic loss aversion. With myopic loss aversion, short sellers 
will become more loss-averse after suffering losses and will cover their short positions. Consistent 
with these arguments, Lamont and Stein (2004), Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos (2011), and Hong et 
al. (2012) find that the trading losses after good news disclosures drive short sellers to cover their 
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positions.
9
 We confirm that for our sample firms, the issuance of good news forecasts leads to 
lower short interest. In addition, if short sellers expect firms to disclose good news in a more 
timely fashion, they will be less willing to take a short position in the firm for the fear of losing out 
when they have to close their position. Another motivation for disclosing good news is to increase 
the confidence of the stakeholders.  
Therefore, with the reduction in short-selling constraints and the increase in short-selling 
during the pilot program, all else equal, the benefit of good news disclosure becomes more 
important. Hence we predict that managers of the pilot firms will increase good news disclosure to 
discourage short sellers as well as to reduce the impact of short selling.
10
  
Bad news disclosure. Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos (2011) find that the trading gain from 
shorting a stock leads short sellers to increase their short position. De Angelis et al. (2013) argue 
that the reduced short-selling constraints faced by the pilot stocks during the pilot program can 
increase the price sensitivity to bad news disclosures because of the increased incentives of bear 
raiders to manipulate the price of these stocks and Grullon et al. (2013) find that for financially 
constrained pilot stocks, their share prices become more sensitive to negative news during the pilot 
program. The above discussions suggest that managers of the pilot firms become less likely to 
disclose bad news. However, withholding bad news may backfire by increasing the likelihood of 
overpricing. If short sellers suspect that firms are hiding bad news, either through observing firms’ 
deviations from past disclosures or through information acquisition and research, they can increase 
                                                 
9 Using daily trading data, Diether et al. (2009b) find that short sellers are more active after positive stock returns. As discussed 
in Savor and Gamboa-Cavazos (2011), Diether et al.’s finding is largely driven by intra-day trading. 
10 Disclosing good news is also associated with costs, such as proprietary costs and litigation costs. For example, Cheng and Lo 
(2006), Cheng et al. (2013), and others argue that disclosing forward-looking good news is subject to litigation risk because such 
information might prove to be wrong ex post. Here we assume that the costs do not change with the pilot program.  
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their short position in the firm.
11
 Another consideration is that withholding bad news is subject to 
potential litigation risk. As discussed in Skinner (1994, 1997), managers have fiduciary duties to 
disclose material information and failing to disclose can lead to litigation risk. The litigation risk 
related to bad news disclosures becomes potentially higher during the pilot program with the 
increase in short selling and the speedier incorporation of bad news in the share prices.
 
 
To summarize, the above discussions suggests that managers of the pilot firms are more 
likely to disclose good news, but they have conflicting incentives for the disclosure of bad news. 
Thus, our hypothesis is directional for good news disclosures and non-directional for bad news 
disclosures:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, the pilot firms are more likely to disclose good news than the control 
firms during the pilot program. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the pilot firms are as likely to disclose bad news as the control firms 
during the pilot program. 
 
3. Sample 
3.1 Sample selection 
To construct our sample, we start with the Russell 3000 index firms in 2004, the set of firms 
from which the SEC selected the pilot stocks. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection 
process. First, following the SEC’s selection criteria, we exclude stocks that were not listed on 
NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq and stocks that went public through IPOs after April 30, 2004. Second, 
following Diether et al. (2009a), we require that firms be included in the Russell 3000 index in 
2005 as well. Firms that dropped out of the Russell index were usually involved in mergers and 
                                                 
11 For example, Christensen et al. (2013) argue that pro-forma disclosure can disguise bad news and find that short-sellers are 
more likely to short stocks with pro-forma disclosure. 
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acquisitions or had other significant corporate events according to the Russell index manual.
12
 We 
also exclude stocks that change tickers during the pilot program. These steps reduce the number of 
the sample firms by 21, 374, and 83, respectively.  
In the empirical analyses, we focus on the issuance of management forecasts, one of the most 
frequently studied types of voluntary disclosures.
13
 We obtain data on management forecasts from 
First Call. Because the pilot stocks were selected by the SEC on July 28, 2004 but the pilot 
program started on May 2, 2005, we eliminate the quarters between these two dates to increase the 
power of the tests.
14
 We use the difference-in-differences approach. The pre period includes the 
fiscal quarters that start after January 1, 2002 and end before July 28, 2004, and the post period 
covers the duration of the pilot program, including the fiscal quarters that start after May 2, 2005 
and end before July 6, 2007. See Figure 2 for the timeline.  
We exclude firms that have missing financial, stock price, analyst data from Compustat, 
CRSP, or I/B/E/S in the pre or post period. To ensure a balanced sample, we require that firms 
have the same number of quarters in the pre and post periods.
15
 The results are qualitatively 
similar if we do not impose this requirement and use an unbalanced sample. Our final sample 
includes 34,718 firm-quarters from 2,352 unique firms, of which 768 are pilot firms and the rest 
                                                 
12 Note that the stocks selected as the pilot stocks remain so even if they are later excluded from the Russell 3000 index. We 
exclude them from our sample because of the confounding effect of mergers and acquisitions or other significant events (Diether 
et al. 2009a).   
13 Besides data availability, another reason we choose to examine management forecasts is that management forecasts are usually 
about near-term earnings. This reduces managers’ incentives to use management forecasts to mislead the market. In an additional 
test, we explicitly examine whether management forecast bias changes for the pilot stocks during the pilot program.  
14 In a sensitivity test, we examine this period and do not find that there is a significant change in disclosures from the pre period 
for the pilot firms relative to the control firms.  
15 For firms with more quarters in the pre period than in the post period, we drop the earlier quarters in the pre period so that the 
number of quarters is the same between the two periods. For example, if we have data for six quarters in the post period, we also 
include six quarters from the pre period – the last six quarters with required data in the pre period. On the other hand, if a firm has 
fewer quarters in the pre period than in the post period, we exclude this firm from the sample. 
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1,484 are control firms.
16
  
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the industry composition of the sample firms. The sample firms 
are from a broad spectrum of industries, with more firms in banking and business service 
industry than in the other industries. 
Panel C of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the pilot and control firms. The 
statistics are measured in fiscal year 2003, the year before the SEC selected the pilot firms. We 
report the statistics on total assets (Size), the market-to-book ratio (M/B), leverage (Leverage), 
return on equity (ROE), trading volume (Trading Volume), and analysts following (Analyst 
Following), separately for the pilot and control firms. We also report the p-values for testing the 
differences in means and medians between the pilot and control firms. As reported in the table, 
there are no significant differences between the pilot and control firms in any of these 
characteristics, consistent with the random selection of the pilot firms by the SEC.  
 
4. Main analysis 
4.1 Univariate tests 
To explore the effect of the reduction in short-selling constraints on management forecasts, 
we first conduct a univariate test. We compare the change in the quarterly frequency of 
management forecasts from the pre to post period between the pilot and control firms, separately 
                                                 
16 Of the 2,352 firms, 85.2% have eight quarters, the maximum possible number of quarters, in both periods, 9.4% have seven 
quarters, 1.5% have six quarters, 1.7% have five quarters, and 2.2% have four or fewer quarters in both periods.  
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for good news and bad news forecasts.
17
 A management forecast is classified as good (bad) news 
if the forecast is higher (lower) than the consensus analyst forecast in the previous 90 days. For 
range management forecasts, we compare the mid-point of the forecast range with analyst 
forecast. For open-ended management forecasts, we classify the forecast as good (bad) news 
when its bottom (upper) bound is higher (lower) than analyst forecast. For qualitative forecasts, 
we follow Anilowski et al. (2007) and classify the forecast as good news if the forecast is coded 
as “meets or exceeds expectations” or “above expectations,” and as bad news if the forecast is 
coded as “below expectations” or “may not meet expectations.” All the other management 
forecasts are classified as neutral news and not included in the analyses.
18
  
Panel A of Table 2 reports the frequency of good news forecasts. In the pre period, the pilot 
firms have a slightly lower frequency of good news forecasts than the control firms. The 
frequency of good news forecasts increases significantly during the pilot program for the pilot 
firms, from 0.261 to 0.295, an increase of 13%, significant at the 0.007 level. In contrast, the 
frequency of good news forecasts decreases over the same period for the control firms, from 
0.280 to 0.269, a decrease of 4%. The difference in the change from the pre to post period between 
these two groups is significant at the 0.003 level.  
Panel B reports the frequency of bad news forecasts. The pilot and control firms have a 
similar frequency of bad news forecasts in the pre period. During the pilot program, both groups 
                                                 
17 We use the quarterly, instead of annual, frequency of management forecasts because both the starting date of the pilot program 
(May 2, 2005) and the ending date (July 6, 2007) are around mid-year. If we use the annual frequency and analyze fiscal years, 
we will lose about half of the post period. Using the quarterly frequency therefore significantly increases the length of the post 
period analyzed and the power of the tests. Examining the annual frequency leads to qualitatively similar results (untabulated). 
18 Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) find that management forecasts are often bundled with earnings announcements, which can 
result in noises in the classification of good vs. bad news forecasts. To address this issue, we follow Rogers and Van Buskirk; for 
bundled forecasts, we estimate a revised (unobservable) analyst expectation after the earnings announcement and use this instead 
of the consensus analyst forecast to classify forecasts. The inferences remain the same (the results are untabulated to save space). 
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experience a significant and similar increase in the frequency of bad news forecasts. The 
difference in the change between the two groups is insignificant (p=0.448).  
Overall, the univariate tests suggest that compared to the control firms, the pilot firms 
experience a significant increase in good news forecasts. The two groups of firms do not differ 
significantly in the change in bad news forecasts.  
4.2 Multivariate tests 
We next use multivariate analyses to control for the effect of other variables that have been 
documented to affect the issuance of management forecasts. We use the following regression: 
  VariablesControlPOSTPILOTPOSTPILOTMF β3210   (1) 
Firm and quarter subscripts are omitted for simplicity. The dependent variable is MF_N or MF_D. 
MF_N captures the frequency of management forecasts and is measured as the number of 
management forecasts issued in a quarter. Since MF_N is bounded below at zero, we use the 
Tobit regression when MF_N is the dependent variable. MF_D captures the likelihood of 
management forecasts and it equals 1 if the firm issues at least one management forecast in the 
quarter, and 0 otherwise. We use the Logit regression when MF_D is the dependent variable. To 
test H1 and H2, we estimate Equation (1) separately for good news and bad news forecasts; the 
dependent variables (MF_N and MF_D) are constructed accordingly.  
PILOT is an indicator variable for the pilot firms. It equals 1 if a firm’s stock was designated 
as a pilot stock by the SEC and 0 for the other firms in the sample. POST is an indicator variable 
for the post period. It equals 1 for firm-quarters in the post period and 0 for those in the pre period. 
The main variable of interest is the interaction of PILOT and POST. A positive (negative) 
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coefficient on the interaction indicates that the pilot firms experience an increase (a decrease) in 
the likelihood or frequency of management forecasts during the pilot program, compared to the 
control firms. 
We include a set of control variables based on prior research. First, prior research indicates 
that managers are more likely to disclose when the demand for information is higher (Baginski and 
Hassel 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Lennox and Park 2006). We use analyst coverage, firm size, and 
growth opportunities (proxied by the market-to-book ratio) to capture the demand for information. 
Second, when the operating environment is uncertain, managers are reluctant to disclose 
forecasts because the forecasts might turn out to be incorrect and managers could face lawsuits. 
We include earnings volatility and return volatility to control for the uncertainty in the operating 
environment. Third, we control for prior stock returns because firms with good performance are 
more likely to provide voluntary disclosures (Miller 2002).
19
 Fourth, when analysts are 
optimistic, managers have incentives to issue forecasts to guide market expectations downward 
(Richardson et al. 2004). We therefore include an indicator variable for analyst optimism. Lastly, 
we include two indicator variables for firms in the high-tech industries and those in the regulated 
industries because managers’ disclosures can be different in these industries. The Appendix 
describes the detailed variable measurements.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on the regression variables. For the full 
sample of firm-quarters, the average number of good news (bad news) forecasts is 0.276 (0.324), 
                                                 
19 In an untabulated sensitivity test, we also follow Chen et al. (2008) and control for contemporaneous stock performance. 
Specifically, we include an indicator variable for firm-quarters with market-adjusted stock returns above the sample median in the 
regressions. The results are quantitatively similar.  
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and 19.2% (21.7%) of the firm-quarters have at least one good news (bad news) forecast. The 
average number of analysts following is 10; the average firm size (total assets) is $6,621 million; 
the average market-to-book ratio is 2.828; the average earnings volatility is 0.249; the average 
return volatility is 2.4%; and the average stock return in the past year is 7.3%. About 30.8% of the 
firm-quarters have optimistic analyst forecasts as of the beginning of the quarter; 21.0% are from 
the high-tech industries; and 9.7% are from the regulated industries. Panel B of Table 3 reports the 
correlations among the independent variables. The correlations are usually small except that 
between firm size and analyst following. 
Table 4 presents the regression results, separately for good news and bad news forecasts. The 
p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. The 
results are consistent with those from univariate analyses. The coefficient on PILOT is not 
significantly different from zero, indicating that the pilot and control firms do not differ in their 
disclosures in the pre period. The coefficient on POST is insignificant for good news forecasts and 
significantly positive for bad news forecasts, indicating that the sample firms experience an 
increase in bad news forecasts over time. Most importantly, the coefficient on the interaction of 
PILOT and POST is significantly positive for good news forecasts (p=0.013 and 0.018, 
respectively, for forecast frequency and likelihood). This result indicates that compared to the 
control firms, the pilot firms experience an increase in the frequency and likelihood of good news 
forecasts during the pilot program. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction is insignificant for 
bad news forecasts (p=0.543 and 0.528, respectively, for forecast frequency and likelihood), 
indicating that the pilot firms do not differ significantly from the control firms in the change in the 
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bad news forecasts.
 20
  
The results for the control variables are largely consistent with prior studies. Specifically, 
analyst coverage and growth opportunities are positively correlated with forecast issuance, 
consistent with the notion that firms with greater demand for information are more likely to issue 
forecasts. Both earnings volatility and return volatility are negatively correlated with forecast 
issuance, suggesting that managers are less likely to provide forecasts when the uncertainty is 
higher. Firms with higher past stock returns are more likely to issue good news forecasts. Firms 
with optimistic analyst forecasts are less likely to issue good news forecasts but are more likely to 
issue bad news forecasts, consistent with managers issuing forecasts to guide market 
expectations. Lastly, firms in regulated industries are less likely to issue forecasts. 
In sum, we find that relative to the control firms, the pilot firms become more likely to issue 
good news forecasts during the pilot program. In contrast, we do not find a significant change in 
bad news forecasts for the pilot firms relative to the control firms. These results are consistent with 
that the pilot firms increase the issuance of good news forecasts when short-selling constraints 
become lower. 
4.3 Cross-sectional analyses for good news forecasts 
In this section, we explore whether the main results vary with manager and firm 
characteristics in a systematic way. Because we only find significant results for good news 
forecasts, we focus on the cross-sectional analyses for good news forecasts. Additional analyses 
(untabulated) indicate that similar analyses for bad news forecasts do not yield significant results. 
                                                 
20 The results are quantitatively similar if we drop the firm-quarters with only bad news forecasts in the analysis of good news 
forecasts (instead of treating bad news forecasts as zero good news forecasts), and vice versa. 
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Managers’ equity and option holdings  
One of the main arguments underlying H1 is that managers are concerned with stock prices 
because their welfare is linked to stock prices (Jensen 2005). It thus follows that the results for 
good news forecasts should be stronger for managers whose wealth is more sensitive to stock price 
changes than for other managers. We test this prediction as follows. We first calculate the change 
in the value of CEO’s equity and option holdings with 1% increase in stock prices, referred to as 
Equity_Incentives. We then include this variable and its interaction with PILOT×POST in 
regression (1). For ease of interpretation, Equity_ Incentives is demeaned (i.e., the sample mean is 
subtracted from its value) so that the coefficient on PILOT×POST can be interpreted as the effect 
for a pilot firm with average Equity_Incentives..  
Panel A of Table 5 reports the regression results. As reported, the coefficient on 
PILOT×POST continues to be positive. More importantly, the coefficient on the three-way 
interaction, PILOT×POST× Equity_ Incentives, is significantly positive (p = 0.057 and 0.053 for 
the frequency and likelihood of good news forecasts, respectively). This suggests that as predicted, 
the incentives for disclosing good news are stronger for the pilot firms when managers’ wealth is 
more sensitive to stock price changes.  
Difficulty of valuing the firm  
Another argument underlying H1 is that managers have incentives to discourage short sellers 
because managers are concerned with the effect of short interest on the stakeholders’ confidence in 
the firm, assuming that the stakeholders interpret short interest as a signal of stock overpricing. 
The stakeholders are more likely to use short interest as a signal when it is more difficult to value a 
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firm based on public information. Thus, the results on good news forecasts should be stronger for 
such cases. We test this prediction by using two proxies for the difficulty of valuing a firm based 
on public accounting information: the magnitude of accruals (|Accruals| and earnings volatility 
(Earn_Volatility). Prior evidence suggests that firms with larger amount of accruals have lower 
earnings quality and it is more difficult to predict future earnings when earnings are volatile (e.g., 
Dechow et al. 1996; Sloan 1996; Gleason et al. 2008). 
We use the same research design as the test based on managers’ equity and option holdings. 
The cross-sectional tests using |Accruals| and Earn_Volatility are reported in Panel B and Panel C 
of Table 5, respectively. These two variables are also demeaned for ease of interpretation of the 
results. In both panels, the coefficient on PILOT×POST continues to be positive. More 
importantly, in Panel B, the coefficient on the three-way interaction, PILOT×POST× |Accruals|, 
is significantly positive (p-value = 0.054 and 0.048 for the frequency and likelihood of good news 
forecasts, respectively); in Panel C, the coefficient on the three-way interaction, PILOT×POST× 
Earn_Volatility, is also significantly positive (p-value = 0.051 and 0.064 for the frequency and 
likelihood of good news forecasts, respectively). 
Overall, the cross-sectional tests indicate that the pilot firms are more likely to issue good 
news forecasts in response to the reduction in short-selling constraints in situations where 
managers are more concerned with the adverse impact of short-selling on stock prices and firm 
performance, such as when managers’ wealth is more sensitive to changes in stock prices and 
when it is more difficult to value the firm based on public accounting information.  
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5. Additional and sensitivity tests 
5.1 Timing of bad news management forecasts 
The main analyses suggest that during the pilot program, the pilot firms become more likely 
to disclose good news, but do not differ from the control firms in disclosing bad news. This is 
consistent with the costs of withholding bad news. In this section, we explore whether the pilot 
firms become more likely to bundle bad news forecasts with good news earnings announcements. 
Doing so reduces the impact of bad news forecasts on stock prices, potentially discouraging short 
sellers (e.g., Graham et al. 2005; Segal and Segal 2013).  
To test this, we estimate the following regression for bad news forecasts: 
  VariablesControlPOSTPILOTPOSTPILOTntInconsiste β3210  (2) 
The dependent variable, Inconsistent, is an indicator variable. It equals 1 if the bad news 
forecast is issued with a good news earnings announcement, and 0 for unbundled bad news 
forecasts.
21
 Since the test is about whether managers bundle the bad news forecast with good news 
earnings announcement, the unit of observation is bad news forecast. The regression is run for 
8,615 bad news forecasts for the sample firms in the pre and post periods, including bad news 
forecasts bundled with inconsistent earnings news and unbundled bad news forecasts.
22
 In the 
above regression, the coefficient on PILOT captures whether the pilot firms are more likely to 
bundle bad news forecasts with good news earnings announcements before the pilot program, the 
                                                 
21 Whether the earnings announcement is good news or bad news depends on whether the actual earning is higher or lower than 
the average of analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement.  
22 We exclude from this regression the bad news forecasts bundled with consistent earnings news (i.e., bad news forecasts issued 
with bad news earnings announcements). The reason is that for such cases, it is possibly infeasible for managers to bundle bad 
news forecasts with good news earnings announcements and thus including those will add noises to the regressions. Note that 
including such cases in the regressions (with Inconsistent defined as 0) leads to quantitatively similar results. Separately, we also 
run the regression using bad news forecasts bundled with inconsistent earnings news and unbundled bad news forecasts that are 
subsequently followed by inconsistent earnings news (i.e., good earnings news). The inferences remain very similar.   
25 
 
 
coefficient on POST captures the change in the likelihood of doing so for the sample firms, and the 
coefficient on PILOT× POST captures the change in this likelihood for the pilot firms compared to 
the control firms. We expect the coefficient on PILOT× POST to be positive if the pilot firms 
become more likely to bundle bad news forecasts with good news earnings announcements during 
the pilot program.  
The list of control variables is the same as in regression (1) with the addition of two 
variables. The first, Past_Bundle, is the average probability of management forecasts being 
bundled with earnings announcements across the quarters in the past four years. This variable 
controls for the influence of past disclosure policy. The second one is the Inverse Mills Ratio for 
the firm-quarter, estimated from the Logit regression of the likelihood of issuing bad news 
forecasts as in Table 4. It is included because Regression (2) is conditional on the issuance of bad 
news forecasts.  
Table 6 presents the regression results. As reported, the coefficient on PILOT is 
insignificantly different from zero, indicating that the pilot firms do not differ from the control 
firms in bundling opposite news in the pre period. The coefficient on POST is positive, indicating 
that the sample firms become more likely to bundle opposite news over time. More importantly, 
the coefficient on PILOT× POST is significantly positive (p=0.042), suggesting that compared to 
the control firms, the pilot firms become more likely to bundle bad news management forecasts 
with good news earnings announcements during the pilot program.  
One concern with the above result is that it might simply be due to the increase in bundling 
management forecasts with earnings announcements over time. While this does not explain the 
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difference between the pilot and control firms, we conduct an additional test to rule out this 
alternative explanation. Specifically, we construct an indicator variable, Consistent, which equals 
1 if the bad news forecast is issued with a bad news earnings announcement, and 0 for unbundled 
bad news forecasts. We run Regression (2) with Consistent as the dependent variable. The 
regression is based on 6,651 bad news forecasts, including bad news forecasts bundled with 
consistent earnings news and unbundled bad news forecasts.
23
 The results, also reported in Table 
6, indicate that while the sample firms become more likely to bundle similar news over time (the 
coefficient on POST is significantly positive), there is no significant difference in such bundling 
between the pilot and control firms during the pilot program (the coefficient on PILOT× POST is 
insignificantly different from zero).  
Taken together, the analyses in this section suggest that compared to the control firms, the 
pilot firms become more likely to bundle bad news forecasts with good news earnings 
announcements during the pilot program, possibly to reduce the adverse impact of bad news 
forecasts on share prices and discourage short sellers.
 24
  
5.2 Management forecast bias 
The main analysis suggests that the pilot firms become more likely to disclose good news 
forecasts during the pilot program than the control firms. Our interpretation is that managers 
disclose more good news to discourage short sellers and reduce the impact of short selling. A 
                                                 
23 If we run the regression using bad news forecasts bundled with consistent earnings news and only unbundled bad news 
forecasts that are subsequently followed by consistent earnings news (i.e., bad earnings news), the inferences remain similar. 
24 The pilot firms potentially can also bundle good news forecasts with bad news earning announcements in order to reduce the 
adverse impact of earnings announcements. We investigate this empirically using similar research designs and good news 
forecasts. We do not find that the pilot firms become more likely to bundle good news forecasts with bad news earnings 
announcements during the pilot program compared to the control firms. The results are not tabulated to save space. 
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natural question is whether managers achieve this by issuing more optimistic forecasts and 
misleading investors. Disclosing optimistically biased news, if suspected, can attract the interest of 
short sellers. Indeed, Christensen et al. (2013) predict and find that this is the case for optimistic 
non-GAAP reporting. Therefore we do not expect that the pilot firms will issue more 
optimistically biased forecasts during the pilot program compared to the control firms.  
We examine the change in management forecast bias during the pilot program to confirm 
this. Specifically, we replace the dependent variable in Regression (1) with two proxies for 
management forecast bias. The first (Bias) is a continuous variable, measured as forecasted EPS 
minus actual EPS scaled by the share price three days prior to the management forecast. The 
second (Optimism) is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if forecasted EPS is greater than 
actual EPS, and 0 otherwise. We add three additional control variables, management forecast 
horizon, an indicator variable for annual forecasts, and the Inverse Mills Ratio from the Logit 
regression of the likelihood of issuing management forecasts. Table 7 presents the regression 
results. We find that the pilot firms do not differ from the control firms in forecast bias in the pre 
period and the sample firms issue more optimistic forecasts over time. More importantly, the 
coefficient on the interaction PILOT× POST is insignificantly different from zero (p=0.332 and 
0.853 for the two specifications, respectively). This suggests that the pilot firms do not issue more 
optimistically biased forecasts during the pilot program than the control firms. In an untabulated 
analysis, we also separately analyze good news and bad news forecasts, and the inferences remain 
the same. 
5.3 Removal of the tick test for all publicly listed firms on July 6, 2007 
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Upon the conclusion of the pilot program, the SEC decided to remove the tick test for all the 
U.S. exchange traded securities, effective on July 6, 2007.
25
 Conceptually this is another event 
that can be used to test the impact of short selling on corporate disclosures. While the short-selling 
constraints faced by the pilot firms remain the same, the control firms now face reduced 
short-selling constraints. Thus, we expect changes in disclosures for the control firms similar to 
what the pilot firms experienced during the pilot program.  
At the same time, this event is not as clean as the pilot program for two reasons. First, the 
SEC introduced additional rules after the removal of the tick test that can affect short selling. For 
example, in July 2008 the SEC required short sellers to borrow shares before trading, instead of 
merely locating a lender. Second, the period after the removal of the tick test largely coincides with 
the financial crisis, potentially confounding the tests. Specifically related to short selling, the SEC 
prohibited all market participants, except market makers, from shorting financial stocks from 
September 18 to October 8, 2008.  
As an additional analysis, we analyze the change in disclosures for the control firms for this 
event (REMOVAL). To mitigate the confounding effect from the financial crisis, we exclude 
financial firms (i.e., those with SICs between 6000 and 6999) from this analysis. We include in 
the removal period the quarters that start after July 6, 2007 and end before February 24, 2010.
26
 
The regression is a modified version of Regression (1): we replace PILOT with NPILOT and 
POST with REMOVAL. NPILOT is the indicator variable for the control firms; it equals 1 for the 
                                                 
25 The announcement by the SEC is on June 13, 2007.  
26 On February 24, 2010, SEC reinstated the tick test for certain circumstances. Thus our removal period ends on February 24, 
2010.  
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control firms and 0 for the pilot firms. REMOVAL is the indicator variable for the removal period; 
it equals 1 for firm-quarters during the removal period, and 0 for firm-quarters in the post period 
(i.e., during the pilot program). The regression is based on 20,626 firm-quarters in the post period 
and in the removal period. The interaction of NPILOT and REMOVAL in the regression captures 
the change in management forecasts for the control firms during the removal period relative to 
the pilot firms.  
Table 8 reports the regression results. For good news forecasts, the interaction NPILOT× 
REMOVAL has a significantly positive coefficient (p=0.026 and 0.060 for the frequency and 
likelihood of forecasts, respectively.)
27
 For bad news forecasts, the interaction is insignificant. 
That is, after the removal of the tick tests for all the firms, compared to the pilot firms, the control 
firms experience a significant increase in the frequency and likelihood of good news forecasts, 
and the two groups of firms do not differ significantly in the change in bad news forecasts. The 
results are consistent with those for the pilot firms during the pilot program, lending further 
support to the main results.  
5.4 Do corporate disclosures affect short interest? 
One of the underlying assumptions for our analyses is that corporate disclosures can affect 
short interest, and more specifically, the disclosure of good news can reduce short interest. In this 
section, we directly test this by examining the change in short interest around management 
forecasts. We use three complementary measures of change in short interest, two based on 
                                                 
27 The positive coefficient on REMOVAL indicates that with the removal of the tick test, the pilot firms do not cut back their 
disclosures down to the level in the pre period. This is consistent with a long run impact of reducing short-selling constraints on 
corporate disclosures. This contrasts with Fang et al. (2013), who find that the impact of the pilot program on earnings 
management is short-lived and earnings management goes back to the pre period level for the pilot stocks once the pilot program 
is over.  
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monthly short interest and one based on daily short sales.  
We obtain data on monthly short interest from Compustat, which reports the level of short 
interest on the 15
th
 of every month (or the preceding trading day if the 15
th
 is not a trading day). 
The sample period is from the beginning of 1999 to September 30, 2010.
28
 To measure the 
change in monthly short interest around a management forecast, we first calculate the raw 
change in monthly short interest as the difference between short interest reported after and before 
the forecast, deflated by the trading volume between the two reporting dates.
29
 We then calculate 
the average change in monthly short interest using all the other months of the same firm over the 
sample period (excluding months with management forecasts or earnings announcements). The 
abnormal change in monthly short interest around a forecast, SHORT[t-1,t], is the difference 
between the raw change and the average change in monthly short interest. The measurement of 
SHORT[t-1,t] is similar to prior research (e.g., Christophe et al. 2004).  
One potential concern with SHORT[t-1,t] is that it may not fully capture short sellers’ 
reaction to the forecast. Therefore, we use an alternative measure, SHORT[t-1,t+1], by extending 
the window after the forecast by one month. The measurement is similar to SHORT[t-1,t] except 
for the longer window.
30
 The drawback of this alternative measure is that it is more likely to be 
confounded by contemporaneous events. 
Our third measure is based on daily short sales. We obtain data on intraday short sales 
                                                 
28 First Call stopped its coverage of management forecasts on September 30, 2010. 
29 For example, for a management forecast issued on June 4, we take the difference in the short interest reported on June 15  
and May 15 and then divide by the trading volume between May 15 and June 15. 
30 For example, for a management forecast issued on June 4, we take the difference in the short interest reported on July 15 and 
May 15 and then divide by the trading volume between May 15 and July 15. We then subtract the average change in short interest 
over a two-month window. 
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during the pilot program from NYSE and Nasdq. We aggregate the intraday short sales to obtain 
daily short sales, which is then deflated by the trading volume in the day. To obtain abnormal short 
sales around a forecast, SHORT[0,2], we calculate the average daily short sales in the three-day 
window (day 0 to day 2, where day 0 is the day of the forecast) then subtract the average daily short 
sales in the other days, i.e., days outside the three-day windows surrounding management forecasts 
or earnings announcements. The advantage of this measure is that it is based on an event window 
and hence less likely to be affected by confounding events. The disadvantage includes (i) the daily 
short sales data is only available from the exchanges during the pilot program as part of the 
requirements of Regulation SHO, and (ii) we do not observe the covering of short positions. 
We use the following regression to examine the abnormal change in short interest around 
management forecasts: 
 VariablesControl NewsBadNewsoodGSHORT   β__ 210       (3) 
The unit of analysis is a management forecast. To identify a benchmark group, we first calculate 
the forecast news as the difference between the forecast (the point forecast or the mid-point of the 
range forecast) and the average analyst forecast issued in the preceding 90 days, deflated by the 
share price three days prior to the forecast. We use neutral news forecasts as the benchmark group, 
including those forecasts with the absolute value of forecast news in the bottom 20% of the sample 
distribution. Good_News (Bad_News) equals 1 if the forecast news is positive (negative) and its 
magnitude is greater than the bottom 20% of the sample distribution, and 0 otherwise. The 
regression is run for the point and range forecasts in order to calculate the forecast news. If 
management forecasts affect short interest as predicted, we expect the coefficient on Good_News 
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to be negative and that on Bad_News to be positive. 
In Regression (3), we control for management forecast characteristics, including the 
magnitude of the forecast news (|FN|), forecast optimism (Optimism), forecast errors (Error), 
forecast range (Range), forecast horizon (Horizon), and an indicator variable for annual forecasts 
(Annual). We also control for variables that might affect the change in short interest, including 
analyst forecast dispersion (Analyst Dispersion), stock return in the prior quarter (Prior Return), 
firm size (Size), growth opportunity (M/B), and return on equity (ROE). Since some management 
forecasts are bundled with earnings announcements, we control for earnings news by including 
an indicator for when the earnings meet or beat analyst forecast (Meet). To control for the 
potential confounding effect of using trading volume as the scalar in calculating the change in 
short interest, we include concurrent trading volume (Trade Volume). Lastly, following 
Christensen et al. (2013), we include the short interest before the forecast as an additional control 
when SHORT[0,2] is the dependent variable. Please see Table 9 for detailed variable 
measurements. 
Table 9 reports the regression results. For change in monthly short interest, we find that good 
news forecasts are associated with a significant decrease in short interest and bad news forecasts 
are associated with a significant increase in short interest. For daily short sales, we find that good 
news forecasts are associated with a significant reduction in daily short sales and bad news 
forecasts are associated with an insignificant change in daily short sales. These findings provide 
general support for our argument that good news disclosure can discourage short sellers while bad 
news disclosures can encourage short sellers. 
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5.5 Do pilot firms have more good news to disclose? 
An alternative explanation for the results is that the pilot firms simply have more good news 
to disclose during the pilot program. One reason is that these firms have better performance during 
this period, and another possibility is that analyst forecast, the benchmark we use to identify good 
and bad news forecasts, reflect the negative sentiment as a result of increased short selling for the 
pilot firms. We conduct additional analyses to rule out these possibilities.  
First, we directly compare the stock and accounting performances during the pilot program 
between the pilot and control firms. We also compare the change in the performance measures 
between the pre and post periods. We do not find any significant differences between the pilot and 
control firms; the two-sided p-values range from 0.319 to 0.802. In a sensitivity test, as reported in 
Panel A of Table 10, we further control for contemporaneous stock and accounting performances; 
the results are very similar to those reported in Table 4.  
Second, instead of using analyst forecast as the market expectation to classify good vs. bad 
forecast news, we use the seasonal random walk model. The results, as reported in Panel B of 
Table 10, are quantitatively similar. We also explicitly examine whether analyst forecasts are more 
pessimistic for the pilot firms than for the control firms during the pilot program. The analyses 
(untabulated) indicate that there are no significant differences between the pilot and control firms. 
Third, prior research find that some pilot firms experienced a reduction in investment and 
financing activities during the pilot program period compared to control firms (Grullon et al. 
2013). To ensure that such differences do not affect the results, we explicitly control for current 
equity financing and capital expenditures. The results, as reported in Panel C of Table 10, are 
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quantitatively similar.  
Overall, these additional analyses indicate that the results are unlikely to be driven by 
differences in performances or analyst forecasts between the pilot and control firms.  
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine how short sellers influence corporate disclosures using a natural 
experiment – the SEC’s pilot program of suspending the tick test for the short orders over the 
period 2005-2007 for a group of randomly selected firms (i.e., the pilot firms). The pilot program 
reduces the short-selling constraints and increases short-selling for the pilot firms.  
We find that compared to the other firms (i.e., the control firms), the pilot firms are more 
likely to increase the frequency and likelihood of good news forecasts from the pre period to the 
post period. With respect to bad news forecasts, we find that the pilot firms do not change the 
frequency or likelihood of bad news forecasts relative to the control firms; the pilot firms, though, 
are more likely to bundle bad news forecasts with good news earnings announcements from the pre 
period to the post period.  
When the pilot program ended in July 2007, the SEC permanently removed the tick test for 
all the firms. In an additional analysis, we examine whether the control firms, now facing the 
reduced short-selling constraints similar to the pilot firms during the pilot program, experience 
similar changes in disclosures. Consistent with the main tests, we find that the control firms 
increase the frequency and likelihood of good news forecasts relative to the pilot firms, after the 
removal of the tick test. In sum, we find that the pilot and control firms respond to increases in 
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short-selling by enhancing good news disclosures; the timing of their response corresponds to their 
respective changes in short-selling constraints – the implementation of the pilot program for the 
pilot firms and the subsequent permanent removal of the tick test for the control firms.  
Our findings suggest that in response to the increase in short-selling, managers improve 
corporate disclosures through more good news disclosures. Our paper contributes to the literature 
by shedding light on how short sellers, an increasingly important group of market players, 
influence corporate disclosures.    
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Appendix Variable definitions 
 
MF_N= The number of management forecasts issued in the quarter; 
MF_D= The likelihood of issuing management forecasts in the quarter; it equals 1 if 
managers issue at least one forecast in the quarter and 0 otherwise; 
PILOT= Indicator for the pilot firms, defined as 1 if a firm was selected by the SEC 
for the pilot program, 0 otherwise; 
POST= Indicator for the post period, defined as 1 for the duration of the pilot 
program, including fiscal quarters that start after May 2, 2005 and end 
before July 6, 2007; it is 0 for the pre period, including the fiscal quarters 
that start after January 1, 2002 and end before July 28, 2004; 
Analyst Following= The number of analysts who issue forecasts for the firm in the previous 
year; 
Size= Total assets (in millions), measured at the end of the previous quarter; for 
regressions, we take the natural logarithm; 
M/B= Market value to book value of equity, measured at the end of the previous 
quarter; 
Earnings Volatility= Standard deviation of quarterly ROE (return on equity) in the previous four 
years; 
Return Volatility= Volatility of daily stock returns in the previous quarter; 
Prior Return= Cumulative size-adjusted returns in the previous four quarters; 
Analyst Optimism= Indicator for analyst optimism, defined as 1 if the consensus analyst 
forecast at the beginning of the quarter is optimistic relative to the realized 
earnings and 0 otherwise; 
High Tech= Indicator for high-tech firms, defined as 1 for firms in the industries with 
SICs of 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577, or 3600-3674; 
Regulated=  Indicator for regulated firms, defined as 1 for firms in the industries with 
SICs of 4812-4813, 4833, 4841, 4811-4899, 4922-4924, 4931, 4941, 
6021-6023, 6035-6036, 6141, or 6311.  
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Figure 1 Time-series Trend of Short Interest 
 
This graph depicts the time-series trend of short interest, measured as the average monthly short interest 
scaled by the number of outstanding shares. The graph is based on all the firms with available data on 
short interest and the number of outstanding shares from Compustat over the period 1990-2012. 
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Figure 2 Timeline 
 
This graph depicts the timeline.  
 
 
Key dates: 
6/23/2004 The SEC adopted Regulation SHO. 
7/28/2004 The SEC announced the list of the pilot stocks.  
5/2/2005  The pilot program started. 
7/6/2007  The pilot program ended and the SEC permanently suspended the tick test for all publicly 
listed stocks.  
2/24/2010 The SEC reinstated the revised tick test, which only applies under limited circumstances.  
 
 
  
5/2/2005 7/6/2007 
Post period (pilot 
program) 
2/24/2010 
 
Permanent removal period 
1/1/2002 
 
Pre period 
7/28/2004 
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Table 1 Sample Selection, Industry Composition, and Comparison of the Pilot and Control 
Firms  
 
This table describes the sample selection process, the industry composition of the sample, and compares 
the pilot and control firms in terms of key firm characteristics. 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Restrictions  
The number 
of firms 
Firms included in the Russell 3000 index in 2004*  3,206 
Less:   
 
Firms not listed on NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq, or firms with IPOs 
after April 30, 2004 21  
 Firms not in the Russell 3000 index in 2005 374  
 Firms that change tickers during the pilot program  83  
 
Firms without required financial, stock price, analyst data in the 
post period 181  
 
Firms without required financial, stock price, analyst data in the 
pre period 78  
 
Firms without the same number of quarters in the pre and post 
periods  117  
Final sample  2,352 
Pilot firms  768 
Control firms  1,484 
* Note that to construct the Russell 3000 index, the 4000 firms listed on the U.S. exchanges with the 
largest market capitalizations are first selected. Among those, the U.S. firms are included in the Russell 
3000 index. Therefore, the number of firms in the Russell 3000 index, usually around 3000, can be 
different from 3000. It happens to be higher than 3000 in 2004. 
 
  
44 
 
 
Table 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Industry composition  
This panel presents the industry composition for the sample of 2,352 firms. 
Industry 
Number 
of firms 
Percentage 
(%) 
 
Industry 
Number 
of firms 
Percentage 
(%) 
Banking 257 10.9% 
 
Chemicals 43 1.8% 
Business Services 250 10.6% 
 
Construction Materials 38 1.6% 
Trading 159 6.8% 
 
Automobiles and Trucks  33 1.4% 
Pharmaceutical 
Products 152 6.5% 
 
Food Products 32 1.4% 
Electronic Equipment 140 5.9% 
 
Restaurants, Hotels, 
Motels 31 1.3% 
Retail 134 5.7% 
 
Electrical Equipment 30 1.3% 
Insurance 94 4.0% 
 
Consumer Goods 29 1.2% 
Utilities 92 3.9% 
 
Apparel 29 1.2% 
Computers 84 3.6% 
 
Healthcare 27 1.1% 
Machinery 76 3.2% 
 
Steel Works  27 1.1% 
Petroleum and Natural 
Gas 72 3.1% 
 
Construction 26 1.1% 
Medical Equipment  71 3.0% 
 
Business Supplies 25 1.1% 
Communication 67 2.8% 
 
Entertainment 23 1.0% 
Wholesale 53 2.3% 
 
Personal Services 23 1.0% 
Measuring and Control 
Equipment  51 2.2% 
 
Others * 150 6.0% 
Transportation 44 1.9%    
* These include 18 other industries, such as printing and publishing, recreation, rubber and plastic 
products, agriculture, and aircraft. These industries have the lowest number of sample firms.  
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Table 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: The comparison between the pilot and control firms in key firm characteristics before the pilot program 
 
This panel presents descriptive statistics on firm characteristics in fiscal year 2003, the year before the SEC selected the pilot firms. The statistics are 
presented separately for the pilot and control firms. A sample firm is a pilot firm if its stock is designated as a pilot stock by the SEC and is a control firm 
otherwise. Size is total assets (in millions), M/B is the market-to-book ratio, Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets, ROE is the ratio of earnings 
before extraordinary items to book value of stockholders’ equity, Trade Volume is the average monthly trading volume (in number of shares), and Analyst 
Following is the number of analysts following the firm.  
 
Pilot firms  
 
Control firms  
 
P-value for the 
differences between 
the pilot and control 
firms in 
 
N Mean Median Std. 
 
N Mean Median Std. 
 
Mean Median 
Size 768 5,322 997 14,687 
 
1,484 6,052 1,023 17,731 
 
0.29 0.53 
M/B 768 3.11 2.29 3.02 
 
1,484 3.16 2.31 3.31 
 
0.69 0.90 
Leverage 768 0.22 0.20 0.20 
 
1,484 0.21 0.18 0.20 
 
0.34 0.23 
ROE 768 0.11 0.10 0.73 
 
1,484 0.08 0.10 0.31 
 
0.38 0.15 
Trade Volume 768 208,631 65,236 420,839 
 
1,484 202,244 60,211 401,414 
 
0.73 0.53 
Analyst Following 768 10 7 9 
 
1,484 10 7 8 
 
0.65 0.85 
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Table 2 Short Selling and Management Forecast Frequency  
– Univariate Analysis 
 
This table reports the average quarterly frequency of management forecasts in the pre and post 
periods. The sample includes 34,718 firm-quarters from 2,352 firms, including 768 pilot firms and 
1,484 control firms. The pre period includes the fiscal quarters that start after January 1, 2002 and end 
before July 28, 2004, and the post period includes the fiscal quarters that start after May 2, 2005 and 
end before July 6, 2007. A management forecast is classified as good (bad) news if the point estimate, 
or the mid-point of the range forecast, is above (below) the average of analyst forecasts issued in the 
90 days before the management forecast. For open-ended management forecasts, the forecast is 
classified as good (bad) news when its bottom (upper) bound is higher (lower) than average analyst 
forecast. For qualitative forecasts, the forecast is classified as good news if the forecast is coded as 
“meets or exceeds expectations” or “above expectations,” and as bad news if the forecast is coded as 
“below expectations” or “may not meet expectations.” The p-values are based on two-tailed t-tests. 
 
Panel A: Good news management forecasts 
 
Pre period Post period 
Difference 
(P-value) 
Pilot firms 0.261 0.295 0.034 
   
(0.007) 
Control firms 0.280 0.269 -0.011 
   
(0.185) 
Difference -0.019 0.026 0.045 
(P-value) (0.080) (0.013) (0.003) 
 
Panel B: Bad news management forecasts 
 
Pre period Post period 
Difference 
(P-value) 
Pilot firms 0.307 0.373 0.065 
   
(0.001) 
Control firms 0.290 0.343 0.053 
   
(0.001) 
Difference 0.016 0.029 0.012 
(P-value) (0.149) (0.016) (0.448) 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on the regression variables 
 
This panel presents descriptive statistics on the regression variables. The sample includes 34,718 firm-quarters from 2,352 firms, including 768 pilot firms and 
1,484 control firms. The pre period includes the fiscal quarters that start after January 1, 2002 and end before July 28, 2004, and the post period includes the 
fiscal quarters that start after May 2, 2005 and end before July 6, 2007. Please see Table 2 for the classification of good news (bad news) management 
forecasts and the Appendix for variable definitions.  
    Percentile   
   Mean  5%  25%  50%  75%  95%  Std. Dev. 
MF_N (Good news forecast frequency)   0.276  0  0  0  0  2  0.663 
MF_N (Bad news forecast frequency)  0.324  0  0  0  0  2  0.738 
MF_D (Good news forecast likelihood)  0.192  0  0  0  0  1  0.394 
MF_D (Bad news forecast likelihood)  0.217  0  0  0  0  1  0.412 
Analyst Following  10  0  4  8  14  27  8 
Size (in millions)   6,621  86  369  1,151  3,680  28,464  19,975 
M/B  2.828  0.774  1.506  2.163  3.354  7.743  3.177 
Earnings Volatility  0.249  0.024  0.039  0.055  0.103  0.877  0.821 
Return Volatility  0.024  0.010  0.015  0.020  0.029  0.049  0.014 
Prior Return  0.073  -0.496  -0.134  0.047  0.258  0.730  0.372 
Analyst Optimism  0.308  0  0  0  1  1  0.462 
High Tech  0.210  0  0  0  0  1  0.407 
Regulated  0.097  0  0  0  0  1  0.296 
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Table 3 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Correlations among the independent variables 
 
This panel presents correlations among the independent variables. The sample includes 34,718 firm-quarters from 2,352 firms, including 768 pilot firms and 
1,484 control firms. The pre period includes the fiscal quarters that start after January 1, 2002 and end before July 28, 2004, and the post period includes the 
fiscal quarters that start after May 2, 2005 and end before July 6, 2007. Please see the Appendix for variable definitions. *, ** indicate significance at the 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. 
 PILOT  POST  
Analyst 
Following Size  M/B 
Earnings 
Volatility 
Return 
Volatility 
Prior 
Return 
Analyst 
Optimism 
High 
Tech 
POST  0.00          
Analyst Following  0.01* 0.00         
Size  -0.02** 0.03** 0.41**        
M/B  0.01 0.05** 0.09** -0.04**       
Earnings Volatility  -0.02** 0.00 -0.02** -0.05** 0.10**      
Return Volatility  -0.03** -0.27** -0.09** -0.18** -0.01* 0.20**     
Prior Return  0.00 -0.17** -0.03** -0.03** 0.19** 0.04** 0.03**    
Analyst Optimism  0.00 0.06** 0.03** 0.00 -0.03** 0.00 0.00 -0.09**   
High Tech  -0.02** 0.00 0.16** -0.10** 0.12** 0.13** 0.31** 0.00 -0.04**  
Regulated  -0.03** 0.00 0.01* 0.13** -0.11** -0.01 -0.10** -0.03** 0.03** -0.17** 
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Table 4 Short Selling and Management Forecasts – Multivariate Analysis 
 
This table reports results from the following regression: 
  VariablesControlPOSTPILOTPOSTPILOTMF β3210  
The sample includes 34,718 firm-quarters from 2,352 firms, including 768 pilot firms and 1,484 control firms. The pre period includes the fiscal quarters that 
start after January 1, 2002 and end before July 28, 2004, and the post period includes the fiscal quarters that start after May 2, 2005 and end before July 6, 
2007. We use Tobit (Logit) regression when MF_N (MF_D) is the dependent variable. Please see Table 2 for the classification of good news (bad news) 
management forecasts and the Appendix for variable definitions. The p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level 
clustering.  
 
  
Good News Forecasts 
 
 Bad News Forecasts 
  
MF_N 
 
MF_D 
 
MF_N 
 
MF_D 
  
Coef. 
P- 
value  Coef. 
P- 
value  Coef. 
P- 
value  Coef. 
P- 
value 
Intercept 
 
-1.976 0.001 
 
-1.461 0.001 
 
-2.037 0.001 
 
-1.431 0.001 
PILOT 
 
-0.141 0.134 
 
-0.113 0.141 
 
0.035 0.709 
 
0.026 0.725 
POST 
 
-0.033 0.554 
 
0.005 0.913 
 
0.141 0.006 
 
0.113 0.007 
PILOT × POST 
 
0.222 0.013 
 
0.170 0.018 
 
0.050 0.543 
 
0.042 0.528 
Analyst Following  0.782 0.001 0.626 0.001  0.851 0.001  0.643 0.001 
Size 
 
-0.013 0.662 
 
-0.016 0.483 
 
-0.036 0.217 
 
-0.037 0.112 
M/B 
 
0.026 0.007 
 
0.019 0.016 
 
0.022 0.038 
 
0.016 0.069 
Earnings Volatility  -0.163 0.006  -0.158 0.003  -0.151 0.010  -0.133 0.010 
Return Volatility 
 
-19.26 0.001 
 
-16.52 0.001 
 
-15.52 0.001 
 
-13.20 0.001 
Prior Return 
 
0.533 0.001 
 
0.429 0.001 
 
0.059 0.367 
 
0.011 0.821 
Analyst Optimism  -0.549 0.001  -0.444 0.001  0.311 0.001  0.217 0.001 
High Tech  0.042 0.681  0.060 0.481  -0.273 0.007  -0.175 0.034 
Regulated 
 
-0.578 0.001 
 
-0.445 0.001 
 
-0.603 0.001 
 
-0.404 0.001 
             
N 
 
34,718 
  
34,718 
  
34,718 
  
34,718 
 Adjusted R
2
  3.93%   5.34%   3.40%   4.83%  
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Table 5 Short Selling and Management Forecasts –  
Cross-sectional Analyses for Good News Forecasts 
 
This table reports results from the following regression for good news forecasts: 






VariablesControlVariablelConditionaPOSTPILOT
VariablelConditionaPOSTVariablelConditionaPILOT
VariablelConditionaPOSTPILOTPOSTPILOTMF
β_
__
_
7
65
43210
 
The full sample includes 34,718 firm-quarters from 2,352 firms, including 768 pilot firms and 1,484 
control firms. The pre period includes the fiscal quarters that start after January 1, 2002 and end 
before July 28, 2004, and the post period includes the fiscal quarters that start after May 2, 2005 and 
end before July 6, 2007. The sample size varies across panels because of additional data requirement. 
We use Tobit (Logit) regression when MF_N (MF_D) is the dependent variable. Please see Table 2 
for the classification of good news (bad news) management forecasts and the Appendix for variable 
definitions. Conditional_Variable is Equity_Incentives in Panel A, |Accruals| in Panel B, and 
Earn_Volatility in Panel C. Equity_Incentives is the natural logarithm of the change in the value of 
CEO’s stock and option holdings with a 1% increase in stock price. |Accruals| is the absolute value of 
total accruals (earnings minus operating cash flows) scaled by average total assets. Earn_Volatility is 
the standard deviation of quarterly return on equity in the previous four years. These three variables 
are demeaned (i.e., the sample mean is subtracted from the value). The p-values are two-sided and are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
 
Panel A: Managers’ equity and option holdings 
 
 
MF_N 
 
MF_D 
 
Coef. 
P- 
value  Coef. 
P- 
value 
Intercept -0.719 0.014 
 
-0.525 0.030 
PILOT -0.111 0.305 
 
-0.098 0.276 
POST -0.050 0.420 
 
-0.005 0.922 
PILOT × POST 0.158 0.122 
 
0.123 0.148 
Equity_Incentives 0.142 0.003 0.118 0.004 
PILOT× Equity_Incentives -0.104 0.150  -0.097 0.105 
POST× Equity_Incentives -0.064 0.154  -0.058 0.126 
PILOT × POST× Equity_Incentives 0.151 0.057  0.122 0.053 
Analyst Following 0.532 0.001  0.431 0.001 
Size -0.094 0.010 
 
-0.082 0.006 
M/B 0.016 0.195 
 
0.011 0.284 
Earnings Volatility -0.059 0.391  -0.072 0.227 
Return Volatility -19.44 0.001 
 
-17.11 0.001 
Prior Return 0.349 0.001 
 
0.287 0.001 
Analyst Optimism -0.609 0.001  -0.500 0.001 
High Tech.. 0.169 0.145  0.170 0.082 
Regulated -0.236 0.123 
 
-0.171 0.183 
      N 20,308 
  
20,308 
 Adjusted R
2
 2.46%   3.93%  
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Table 5 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: The magnitude of accruals 
 
 
MF_N 
 
MF_D 
 
Coef. 
P- 
value  Coef. 
P- 
value 
Intercept -2.127 0.001 
 
-1.627 0.001 
PILOT -0.155 0.103 
 
-0.126 0.107 
POST -0.047 0.396 
 
-0.002 0.959 
PILOT × POST 0.222 0.014 
 
0.170 0.021 
|Accruals| 0.483 0.416 0.284 0.553 
PILOT × |Accruals| -1.662 0.115  -1.260 0.152 
POST × |Accruals| -3.313 0.001  -2.654 0.001 
PILOT × POST × |Accruals| 2.996 0.054  2.555 0.048 
Analyst Following 0.663 0.001  0.535 0.001 
Size 0.051 0.087 
 
0.036 0.143 
M/B 0.023 0.014 
 
0.017 0.028 
Earnings Volatility -0.160 0.005  -0.157 0.003 
Return Volatility -19.92 0.001 
 
-17.09 0.001 
Prior Return 0.503 0.001 
 
0.409 0.001 
Analyst Optimism -0.549 0.001  -0.450 0.001 
High Tech 0.016 0.877  0.041 0.623 
Regulated -0.633 0.001 
 
-0.490 0.001 
      N 31,246   31,246  
Adjusted R
2
 3.98%   3.93%  
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Table 5 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Earnings volatility 
 
 
MF_N 
 
MF_D 
 
Coef. 
P- 
value  Coef. 
P- 
value 
Intercept -2.011 0.001 
 
-1.491 0.001 
PILOT -0.150 0.109 
 
-0.122 0.110 
POST -0.047 0.400 
 
-0.014 0.760 
PILOT × POST 0.233 0.009 
 
0.186 0.011 
Earn_Volatility -0.002 0.978 -0.022 0.714 
PILOT× Earn_Volatility -0.257 0.022  -0.189 0.057 
POST× Earn_Volatility -0.278 0.011  -0.264 0.017 
PILOT × POST × Earn_Volatility 0.310 0.051  0.284 0.064 
Analyst Following 0.781 0.001  0.626 0.001 
Size -0.012 0.662 
 
-0.017 0.477 
M/B 0.027 0.004 
 
0.020 0.011 
Return Volatility -19.34 0.001 
 
-16.66 0.001 
Prior Return 0.521 0.001 
 
0.417 0.001 
Analyst Optimism -0.550 0.001  -0.445 0.001 
High Tech 0.043 0.677  0.062 0.472 
Regulated -0.574 0.001 
 
-0.443 0.001 
      N 34,718   34,718  
Adjusted R
2
 3.98%   5.41%  
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Table 6 Short Selling and Timing of Bad News Management Forecasts 
 
This table reports Logit regression analysis of the timing of bad news management forecasts based on 
the following model: 
  VariablesControlPOSTPILOTPOSTPILOTntInconsiste β3210  
  VariablesControlPOSTPILOTPOSTPILOTConsistent β3210  
Inconsistent equals 1 if the bad news management forecast is issued with a good news earnings 
announcement, and 0 for unbundled bad news forecasts. Consistent equals 1 if the bad news 
management forecast is issued with a bad news earnings announcement, and 0 for unbundled bad 
news forecasts. Please see Table 2 for the classification of good news (bad news) management 
forecasts. Whether the earnings announcement is good news or bad news depends on whether the 
actual earnings is higher or lower than the average of analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days prior to 
the earnings announcement. Past_Bundle is the average probability of management forecasts being 
bundled with earnings announcements across the quarters in the past four years. Inverse Mills Ratio 
for the firm-quarter is estimated from the Logit regression of the likelihood of bad news forecasts as 
in Table 4. Please see the Appendix for the measurement of the other variables. The sample includes 
11,262 bad news forecasts issued by 768 pilot firms and 1,484 control firms in the pre and post 
periods. When Inconsistent (Consistent) is the dependent variable, the regression is based on bad 
news forecasts bundled with inconsistent (consistent) earnings announcements and unbundled bad 
news forecasts. The p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level 
clustering. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable = 
Inconsistent  
Dependent variable = 
Consistent 
  Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value 
Intercept  -1.773 0.001  -1.418 0.001 
PILOT  -0.049 0.586  0.155 0.154 
POST  0.492 0.001  0.618 0.001 
PILOT × POST  0.232 0.042  -0.095 0.485 
Analyst Following  -0.036 0.001  -0.017 0.028 
Size  0.061 0.021  -0.026 0.395 
M/B  0.030 0.007  0.000 0.993 
Earnings Volatility  0.014 0.771  -0.135 0.038 
Return Volatility  -0.530 0.892  5.198 0.249 
Prior Return  0.047 0.620  -0.783 0.001 
High Tech  0.186 0.040  -0.016 0.882 
Regulated   0.022 0.874  0.064 0.671 
Past_Bundle   1.360 0.001  0.931 0.001 
Inverse Mills Ratio   0.594 0.001  0.465 0.001 
 
      
N  8,615   6,651  
Adjusted R
2
  6.38%   5.63%  
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Table 7 Short Selling and Management Forecast Bias 
 
This table reports the following regression results:  
  VariablesControlPOSTPILOTPOSTPILOTOptimismBias β3210/  
The regression is run for 21,732 management forecasts issued by 768 pilot firms and 1,484 control 
firms in the pre and post periods. We use OLS (Logit) regression when Bias (Optimism) is the 
dependent variable. Bias is forecasted EPS minus actual EPS, scaled by the share price three days 
prior to the forecast. Optimism is 1 if forecasted EPS is greater than actual EPS, and 0 otherwise. 
Horizon is the natural logarithm of the number of days between the management forecast and the 
earnings announcement. Annual equals 1 for annual forecasts and 0 for quarterly forecasts. Inverse 
Mills Ratio for the firm-quarter is estimated from the Logit regression of the likelihood of issuing 
management forecasts using the model specification in Table 4. Please see the Appendix for the 
measurement of the other variables. The p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
 
  
Bias 
 
Optimism 
 
 
Coef. P-value 
 
Coef. P-value 
Intercept 
 
-0.071 0.001 
 
-0.327 0.001 
PILOT 
 
0.000 0.913 
 
0.006 0.770 
POST 
 
0.003 0.097 
 
0.040 0.012 
PILOT × POST 
 
0.003 0.332 
 
-0.005 0.853 
Analyst Following 
 
0.000 0.071 
 
-0.003 0.003 
Size 
 
0.001 0.142 
 
-0.007 0.182 
M/B 
 
0.000 0.847 
 
-0.005 0.010 
Earnings Volatility 
 
-0.002 0.127 
 
-0.009 0.377 
Return Volatility 
 
0.673 0.001 
 
4.466 0.001 
Prior Return 
 
-0.023 0.001 
 
-0.206 0.001 
High Tech 
 
-0.003 0.150 
 
-0.065 0.001 
Regulated 
 
0.001 0.731 
 
-0.030 0.291 
Horizon 
 
0.011 0.001 
 
0.130 0.001 
Annual 
 
-0.003 0.029 
 
0.001 0.960 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.009 0.001  -0.053 0.002 
       N 
 
21,732 
  
21,732 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
4.06% 
  
7.26% 
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Table 8 Short Selling and Management Forecasts – Analysis of the Permanent Removal Period 
 
This table reports results from the following regression: 
   VariablesControlREMOVALNPILOTREMOVALNPILOTMF β3210  
The sample includes 20,626 firm-quarters from 2,352 firms, including 768 pilot firms and 1,484 control firms from the post period and the permanent 
removal period. The post period includes the fiscal quarters that start after May 2, 2005 and end before July 6, 2007, and the permanent removal period 
includes the fiscal quarters that start after July 6, 2007 and end before February 24, 2010. We use Tobit (Logit) regression when MF_N (MF_D) is the 
dependent variable. Please see Table 2 for the classification of good news (bad news) management forecasts. NPILOT equals 1 for the control firms and zero 
for the pilot firms. REMOVAL equals 1 for firm-quarters in the permanent removal period and 0 for firm-quarters in the post period. Please see Appendix A 
for the measurement of the other variables. The p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
 
 Good News Forecasts  Bad News Forecasts 
 
MF_N 
 
MF_D 
 
MF_N 
 
MF_D 
 
Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value 
Intercept -2.731 0.001 
 
-2.201 0.001 
 
-3.030 0.001  -2.239 0.001 
NPILOT -0.184 0.053 
 
-0.138 0.105 
 
-0.069 0.492  -0.063 0.466 
REMOVAL 0.239 0.003 
 
0.261 0.001 
 
0.203 0.008  0.205 0.002 
NPILOT × REMOVAL 0.201 0.026 
 
0.152 0.060 
 
0.004 0.962  0.029 0.705 
Analyst Following 0.531 0.001 0.441 0.001  0.623 0.001  0.491 0.001 
Size 0.091 0.003 
 
0.070 0.012 
 
0.099 0.004  0.063 0.034 
M/B 0.006 0.584 
 
0.006 0.573 
 
0.008 0.490  0.004 0.691 
Earnings Volatility -0.243 0.001  -0.274 0.001  -0.208 0.001  -0.194 0.004 
Return Volatility -22.41 0.001 
 
-21.83 0.001 
 
-16.98 0.001  -16.47 0.001 
Prior Return 0.351 0.001 
 
0.298 0.001 
 
-0.117 0.109  -0.137 0.025 
Analyst Optimism -0.634 0.001  -0.573 0.001  0.029 0.517  -0.018 0.644 
High Tech 0.001 0.990  0.037 0.693  -0.396 0.001  -0.301 0.001 
Regulated -0.530 0.004 
 
-0.483 0.003 
 
-0.554 0.003  -0.397 0.016 
            
N 20,626   20,626   20,626   20,626  
Adjusted R
2
 5.46%   7.64%   3.86%   6.29%  
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Table 9 Change in Short Interest around Management Forecasts 
 
This table reports the regression analysis of the change in short interest around the management 
forecasts based on the following regression: 
 VariablesControl NewsBadNewsoodGSHORT   β__ 210  
SHORT is the change in short interest around the management forecast and is one of the following 
three variables: SHORT[t-1,t], SHORT[t-1,t+1], and SHORT [0, 2]. SHORT[t-1,t] (SHORT[t-1,t+1]) is the 
abnormal change in monthly short interest from month t-1 to month t (t+1) around the forecast. 
SHORT [0, 2] is the average daily abnormal short sale in the three-day window around the forecast ([0, 
2], where day 0 is the day of the forecast). The regression for SHORT[t-1,t] and SHORT[t-1,t+1] is based 
on 56,348 management forecasts (point and range forecasts) issued between January 1, 1999 and 
September 30, 2010. The regression for SHORT [0, 2] is based on 15,230 management forecasts (point 
and range forecasts) issued during the pilot program for stocks traded on NYSE and Nasdaq. The 
p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
 
 
SHORT[t-1,t] 
 
SHORT[t-1,t+1]  SHORT[0,2] 
 
Coef. P-value 
 
Coef. P-value  Coef. P-value 
Intercept -0.878 0.092 
 
-2.267 0.001  2.369 0.001 
Good_News -0.115 0.093 
 
-0.153 0.094  -0.341 0.096 
Bad_News 0.115 0.071 
 
0.192 0.021  0.029 0.891 
|FN| -6.520 0.125 
 
-5.445 0.288  17.771 0.003 
Optimism 0.122 0.052 
 
0.324 0.001  0.012 0.941 
Error -0.072 0.959 
 
-1.305 0.553  0.090 0.890 
Range -3.491 0.001 
 
-8.769 0.001  26.381 0.488 
Horizon 0.303 0.001 
 
0.666 0.001  -0.114 0.372 
Annual -0.205 0.003 
 
-0.433 0.001  0.108 0.533 
Analyst Dispersion -0.248 0.801 
 
-2.046 0.157  1.646 0.713 
Prior Return -1.452 0.001 
 
-1.732 0.001  1.170 0.088 
Size -0.006 0.854 
 
-0.010 0.792  -0.042 0.391 
M/B -0.005 0.272 
 
0.001 0.864  -0.123 0.001 
ROE -0.460 0.091 
 
-0.345 0.455  1.874 0.195 
Meet 0.036 0.609 
 
0.099 0.339  -0.340 0.037 
Trade Volume -0.025 0.527 
 
-0.028 0.556  -0.368 0.001 
Prior short interest 
     
 -0.587 0.723 
         
N 56,348 
  
56,348 
 
 15,230  
Adjusted R
2
 0.44% 
  
0.62% 
 
 1.00%  
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Table 9 (Cont’d) 
 
Variable definitions: 
SHORT[t-1,t] 
(SHORT[t-1,t+1]) = 
the difference between the raw change and the normal change in monthly short 
interest, where the raw change is the difference in the short interest reported after 
the forecast (one month after the forecast) and the short interest reported before 
the forecast, deflated by the trading volume between the two reporting dates, and 
the normal change is the average change in short interest over one month (two 
months) for all the months without management forecasts or earnings 
announcements, deflated by the trading volume between the two reporting dates; 
SHORT [0, 2] = the average daily short sales in the three day window [0,+2] (deflated by daily 
trading volume) minus the average daily short sales outside the three day 
windows surrounding management forecasts or earnings announcements (also 
deflated by daily trading volume), where day 0 is the day of the management 
forecast; 
Good_News 
(Bad_News) = 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the forecast news is positive (negative) and 
the absolute value of the forecast news is greater than the bottom 20% of the 
sample distribution; management forecasts with the absolute value of the 
forecast news in the bottom 20% of the sample distribution are treated as neutral 
news and serve as the benchmark group;  
|FN| = the absolute value of the forecast news, where the forecast news is the difference 
between forecasted EPS and the average analyst forecast issued in the preceding 
90 days, scaled by the share price three days before the forecast; 
Optimism = 1 if forecasted EPS is higher than actual EPS, and 0 otherwise; 
Error = the absolute value of the difference between forecasted EPS and actual EPS, 
scaled by the share price three days before the forecast; 
Range = the forecast range for range forecasts, scaled by the share price three days before 
the forecast; 0 for point forecasts; 
Horizon = the natural logarithm of the number of days between the forecast and the 
corresponding earnings announcement; 
Annual = 1 for annual management forecasts, and 0 for quarterly management forecasts; 
Analyst 
Dispersion = 
the standard deviation of analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days before the 
forecast, scaled by the share price three days before the forecast; 
Prior Return = cumulative size-adjusted stock returns in the prior 90 days; 
Size = the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions) at the end of the year before the 
forecast; 
M/B = the market-to-book ratio at the end of the year before the forecast; 
ROE = the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items to common shareholders’ equity 
for the prior year; 
Meet = 1 if the actual earnings are the same as, or higher than, the consensus analyst 
forecast, and 0 otherwise, for bundled management forecasts; 0 for unbundled 
management forecasts; 
Trade Volume = the natural logarithm of the concurrent trading volume; it is the total trading 
volume between the two reporting dates of short interest when SHORT[t-1,t] or 
SHORT[t-1,t+1] is the dependent variable; it is the total trading volume from day 0 
to day 2 when SHORT [0, 2] is the dependent variable; 
Prior Short 
Interest = 
the monthly short interest reported before the forecast, scaled by the number of 
shares outstanding in the previous month. 
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Table 10 Sensitivity Tests 
 
This table reports results from the following regression: 
  VariablesControlPOSTPILOTPOSTPILOTMF β3210  
The sample includes 34,718 firm-quarters from 2,352 firms, including 768 pilot firms and 1,484 
control firms. The pre period includes the fiscal quarters that start after January 1, 2002 and end 
before July 28, 2004, and the post period includes the fiscal quarters that start after May 2, 2005 and 
end before July 6, 2007. We use Tobit (Logit) regression when MF_N (MF_D) is the dependent 
variable. Please see Table 2 for the classification of good news (bad news) management forecasts and 
the Appendix for variable definitions. The p-values are two-sided and are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm-level clustering.  
 
  
Good News Forecasts 
 
 Bad News Forecasts 
  
MF_N 
 
MF_D 
 
MF_N 
 
MF_D 
  
Coef. 
P- 
value  Coef. 
P- 
value  Coef. 
P- 
value  Coef. 
P- 
value 
Panel A: Controlling for contemporaneous performance measures 
Intercept 
 
-2.148 0.001 
 
-1.629 0.001 
 
-1.850 0.001 
 
-1.315 0.001 
PILOT 
 
-0.146 0.115 
 
-0.116 0.131 
 
0.030 0.744 
 
0.024 0.749 
POST 
 
-0.043 0.432 
 
-0.003 0.945 
 
0.094 0.069 
 
0.078 0.066 
PILOT × POST 
 
0.227 0.010 
 
0.174 0.016 
 
0.055 0.496 
 
0.044 0.504 
Control variables  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 
 
34,718 
  
34,718 
  
34,718 
  
34,718 
 Adjusted R
2
  4.89%   6.60%   4.15%   5.90%  
Panel B: Using seasonal random walk model to classify good news and bad news 
Intercept 
 
-1.657 0.001 
 
-1.107 0.001 
 
-3.585 0.001 
 
-2.263 0.001 
PILOT 
 
-0.106 0.307 
 
-0.056 0.465 
 
0.072 0.583 
 
0.043 0.655 
POST 
 
0.086 0.149 
 
0.105 0.016 
 
0.081 0.336 
 
0.055 0.388 
PILOT × POST 
 
0.228 0.013 
 
0.146 0.033 
 
-0.055 0.707 
 
-0.025 0.822 
Control variables  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 
 
34,718 
  
34,718 
  
34,718 
  
34,718 
 Adjusted R
2
  4.36%   7.71%   2.94%   2.55%  
Panel C: Controlling for contemporaneous investment and financing activities 
Intercept 
 
-2.126 0.001 
 
-1.561 0.001 
 
-2.227 0.001 
 
-1.557 0.001 
PILOT 
 
-0.147 0.116 
 
-0.118 0.124 
 
0.024 0.792 
 
0.019 0.797 
POST 
 
-0.047 0.394 
 
-0.007 0.880 
 
0.115 0.026 
 
0.094 0.025 
PILOT × POST 
 
0.223 0.012 
 
0.172 0.017 
 
0.054 0.510 
 
0.045 0.491 
Control variables  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 
 
34,718 
  
34,718 
  
34,718 
  
34,718 
 Adjusted R
2
  4.00%   5.41%   3.55%   4.99%  
 
 
 
